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Despite similar standards of living, the secondary education systems of France, the
Netherlands, Britain and the United States produce very different levels and patterns of
achievement. In primary school, Americans do not lag behind their European counterparts.
Reading ability varies little across these four countries. However, wh n 14 year olds were
compared at the beginning of the 1980s, the French and Dutch were about 1.3 to 1.5 grade
level equivalents ahead of the Americans in math and science. At the end of secondary school,
performance differentials appear to be even larger.
What causes differences in secondary school achievement across these four nations?
The first two sections of the paper describe the achievement differences among the four
countries and examine the proximate causes of the differentials. I conclude that these
achievement differentials are caused by differences in the quality of teachers and of student
time and effort inputs devoted to academic achievement.
There remains, however, the key question: why do students, teachers, parents, school
administrators and voters in America place a lower priority on academic achievement than their
counterparts abroad? Why, for example, is student engagement in learning lower in the U.S.
than in France and the Netherlands? It turns out that sign ling theory, game theory and
agency theory have much to contribute to the understanding of these phenomena. These
connections are laid out in Section 3. The fundamental cause appears to be the structure of
incentives for learning and for the high quality teaching of demanding material. American
employers reward credentials, but they fail to recognize and reward what is actually learned in
school. Admission to the best colleges depends on measures of relative performance--rank in
class and grades--and aptitude tests which do not assess what is taught in school; not external
assessments of competence in particular subjects. Only one of the fifty states has a system of
subject specific external exams similar to the Bac, the GCSE and the Dutch exams. The result
has been grade inflation and students selecting undemanding courses where it is easy to get a
high grade. Students pressure each other not to study, because they are being graded on a
curve. Teachers are pressured to keep failure rates low, so passing standards are effectively
forced down by peer pressure against studying. The final section summarizes the analysis and
then comments about implications for economic analysis of educational policy.
I. DIFFERENTIALS IN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
The differences in achievement levels at age 13, 14 and 15 are summarized in Table 1.
The table presents data from studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s comparing France, the
Netherlands, England, Scotland, Sweden and the United States.
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Table 1
Achievement in Lower Secondary School
        1982 IEA        1991 IEA          1983 IEA Science  1991 IAEP Mathematics     1991 IAEP Science
           Math     Reading          Age 14-15      Adj.       Level               Gain       Level            Gain
        Age 13-14   Age Adjusted       (not adj          for      Age 13              Age 9     Age 13          Age 9
        % Correct  Age     Age 14        for age)        Age   % Correct              to      % Correct          to
 9  Mean   (SD)   Mean    (SD)    Diff      Mean    (SD)   Age13     Mean   (SD)   Age 13
France 53.9 526 533 (68) --- --- --- 64.2 (20.3) --- 68.6 (17.1) ---
Netherlands 57.1 494 523 (76) 63.7 (16.1)62.2 --- --- --- --- --- ---
England 47.1 --- --- --- 55.9 15.7) 62.2 60.6 (21.4) 29.8 68.7 (17.5) 18.7
Scotland 48.4 --- --- --- --- --- --- 60.6 (20.3) 26.5 67.9 (16.5) 20.8
United States 46.4 543 528 (85) 53.7 (16.7) 53.7 55.3 (20.9) 25.4 67.0 (16.4) 17.2
                                                                                                                                                  
Column 1 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the grade where the majority have attained
13:00 to 13:11 years by the middle of the school year from the Second International Mathematics Study
(McKnight et al 1987, p. 124). The French, English, and American students all had the same mean age,
14.1. Mean age was 13.9 for Sweden, 14.0 for Scotland and 14.4 for Netherlands. Adjusting for the
greater age of the Dutch students would have lowered their percent correct by about 2 points.
Columns 2, 3 & 4 are the age adjusted means and standard deviations of the overall reading score in the
IEA reading study (Elley 1992, pp. 108-9).
Columns 5 & b are the percent correct and standard deviation for 9th graders on the full 50 item IEA
science test (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, p. 60 & 74). An estimate of how U.S. students would have
performed on the full test was made by subtracting 1.1 percentage points (the average difference
between core and full test scores for England, the Netherlands) from the U.S.'s core test score. The mean
age of students differed a great deal. Mean age was 14:2 for England, 15.3 for the United States and 15:6
for the Netherlands.
Column 7 is an estimate of scores for the full 50 item IEA science test for students who are 15.3 years
old, the mean age of U.S. students. The age gradient used was the average for Sweden (4.3) and Italy
(7.4), the two countries for which it was available.
Columns 8, 9, 11 and 12 are the mean percent correct and standard deviation from the 1991 IAEP study
of mathematics and science achievement of 13 year olds (IAEP, 1992a 1992b).
Columns 10 & 13 are the increase in the percent correct on items common to the tests given to 9 and 13
year olds.
Mathematics: In the 1981/82 study of mathematics achievement of 13-14 year olds
conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA),
Dutch and French 13-14 year olds ranked number 2 and 3 (behind only Japan). Of the 17
industrialized nations participating in the study of 13-14 year olds, Americans were ranked 12th,
English 11th and Scots 10th (McKnight et al. 1987). After adjustment for small differences in
mean age, American 14 year olds scored about 40 percent of a U.S. standard deviation (or
roughly 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents) below French and Dutch students of comparable age.
The 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) mathematics study
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obtained similar results. The gap between French and American 13 year olds was 45 percent of
a U.S. standard deviation (about 1.5 U.S. grade level equivalents). British students were about
half way between the French and the Americans (IAEP 1992a).
The performance gap between the American and European students grows even larger
during upper secondary school. Evidence of this can be found in Table 2. The Americans who
participated in the Second International Math Study were high school seniors in college
preparatory math courses like trigonometry, precalculus and calculus. This very select group,
representing 13 percent of American 17-18 year olds, got 39.8 percent of the questions correct.
The 6 percent of English students studying mathematics at A level got 59.8 percent correct
McKnight et al 1987). Substantial proportions of French and Dutch secondary students
specialize in mathematics and science (20 percent of French youth are in the mathematics and
science lines known as C, D or E of the lycee general) and the questions they are asked on
their final examinations suggest that these students achieve at a very high level.
Table 2
Achievement at the End of Upper Secondary School
       1982 IEA Mathematics            1983 IEA Science--Final Year of Upper Secondary School
            Final Yr. of Sec. Sch.                Physics                  Chemistry          Biology                Total
            Percent  %Age  %Time     Percent %Age Hrs/      Percent %Age Hrs/     Percent %Age Hrs/    Science
                       Correct   Group   Math      Correct Group Week    Correct Group Week    Correct Group Week   Hmwk
France --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Netherlands --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Belgium 50.0 10 20 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Finland 60.6 15 14 37.9 14 2.0 35.9 16 1.0 50.2 41 2.0 3.1
Norway --- --- --- 54.1 10 5.0 44.3 6 5.0 55.4 4 5.0 ---
England 59.8 6 21 62.4 6 5.1 69.3 5 5.2 62.4 4 5.2 7.2
Scotland 42.8 18 17 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
United States 39.8 12 14 45.3 1 5.0 37.7 2 5.0 38.1 12 5.0 2.8
                                                                                                                                                 
Column 1 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the final year of secondary school from the
Second International Mathematics Study (McKnight et al 1987, p. 124). The mean age was 17:8 for the
US, 18:1 for England, 16:9 for Scotland, 18:6 for Finland, 19.2 for Sweden and 18:3 for Belgium. Column
2 is the share of the age cohort in advanced mathematics courses included in the study. Column 3 is the
share of school time spent in mathematics classes.
Columns 4, 7 & 10 give the percent correct for students studying each science subject in the final year of
secondary school. Column 5, 8 and 11 are the proportions of the age cohort taking each science subject
in the final year of secondary school [for the U.S. it is the share of students taking their second year of the
subject7. Columns 6, 9 and 12 are the number of hours per week spent in classes in each science
subject. (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, p. 6, 36, 37 & 69).The mean age was 17:5-17:10 for the U.S.,
18:0 for England, 18:7 for Finland and 18:11 for Norway.
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Science: In the 1983 IEA study of science achievement of 14-15 year olds, the
Netherlands ranked 3rd and the U.S. ranked last among 17 industrialized countries. After a
rough adjustment for age differences, American students lagged slightly more than half a
standard deviation (about 1.5 U.S. grade level equivalents) behind English, Dutch students.
While a big gap is visible at age 14-15 no such gap is visible at age 10-1  (Postlethwaite and
Wiley 1992).
The 1991 IAEP science study found that at age 9 American students were ahead of
students in Scotland England and most other European countries (data for France and
Netherlands is not available for this age). By age 13, English, Scotch and French students were
ahead, though the differences were small and not statistically significant (IAEP 1992b).
Few American upper secondary students study science in depth (see Table 2). Only 1 or
2 percent of the age cohort take two years of physics or two years of chemistry. Despite the
highly selected nature of this group (many of whom were taking the subject for Advanced
Placement college credit), only 47.5 percent of the questions were answered correctly on the
IEA physics exam and only 37.7 percent were correct on the IEA chemistry exam. The 4 or 5
percent of the age cohort of English youth who in their 13th year of schooling were studying
these subjects for their A levels got 62.4 percent and 69.3 percent correct respectively
(Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992).
Reading: In the 1990/91 IEA study of reading achievement, age adjusted scores
indicate that Swedish and American 9 year olds were reading about two-thirds of a U.S
standard deviation better than Dutch 9 year olds and about .18 SDs better than French 9 year
olds. However, by age 14 differences between the four countries (see column 3 of Table 1)
were small.
II. TEACHER QUALITY, TIME, AND ENGAGEMENT:
The Proximate Causes of Achievement Differentials
American elementary school students do not lag far behind their counterparts in Europe.
Indeed in reading they are substantially ahead. What then caused the large deficits in
achievement in mathematics and science at the end of secondary school? Why does
achievement lag in math and science and not in reading? This section of the paper examines
the proximate causes of the achievement differentials. It is organized around six proposed
explanations of achievement differentials across countries:
1)   Diversity
2)   Restricted access to secondary education
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3)   Teacher quality and salaries
4)   Priority given to academic achievement
5)   Time devoted to instruction and study
6)   Engagement--Effort per unit of scheduled time
2.1 Diversity
Non-Hispanic whites score about .45 grade level equivalents (GLE) higher than the
overall U.S. average on NAEP reading tests, about .56 GLE higher on NAEP mathematics tests
and .98 GLE higher on NAEP science tests. If all French and Dutch students are compared to
the 77 percent of American students who are neither black nor Hispanic, the European
advantage is smaller. For mathematics at age 13, the gap would be about 0.9 grade level
equivalents in both 1982 and 1991. In science, U.S. white 13 year olds were about one-half
GLE behind the Dutch in 1983 and about .6 GLE ahead of French 13 year olds in 1991. But, are
these fair comparisons? The U.S. is not the only country challenged by ethnic diversity. The
share of the students who are taught in a language different from their own mother tongue is 6
percent in both France and the United States, 5 percent in Scotland, 12 percent in Canada, 15
percent in Northern Italy and 20 percent in Switzerland (IAEP 1991a). If one is to adjust scores
for the demographic and socio-economic background of students, why not hold parent's
education constant as well. If this were done, the French/Dutch lead over the U.S. would
increase.
2.2 Access--Numbers of Students and Graduates
It is sometimes said that low achievement is the price one must pay for greater access.
However, only the United Kingdom exhibits the expected tradeoff between achievement levels
and enrollment ratios (see Table 3). The 17 and 18 year olds preparing for A level exams
achieve at high levels, but they represent a decided minority of the age cohort. British
secondary school completion rates were high in OECD data because passing one or more
GCSE exams at age 16 was counted as completion. If one or more A level exams had been the
definition of secondary school graduation, the graduation rate would have been 28 percent
(Government Statistical Office 1992, p. 8).
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Table 3
1991 Enrollment and Completion Rates
Nether  United United
France  -lands Kingdom States
Percent Enrolled FT in Secondary School1
At age 16 92.0% 97.2% 62.4% 90.2%
At age 17 86.4% 90.0% 43.1% 74.7%
At age 18 57.2% 67.4% 12.3% 21.1%
At age 19 31.6% 41.5% 3.4% 5.0%
Secondary Diplomas Awarded/Population
     of Theoretical Completion Age2 75.8% 82.2% 74.4% 75.5%
FT Equiv. Enrollment in Tertiary Education3
Age 18-21 26.6% 19.5% 16.0% 33.4%
Age 22-25 12.7% 14.0% 4.8% 13.5%
Age 26-29 4.0% 4.0% 2.2% 6.2%
First-degree Graduates from Universities/
     Pop. of Theoretical Completion Age4 16.3% 8.3% 18.4% 29.6%
FTE Years in School betw Age 16-295 4.6 yrs 4.9 yrs 2.3 yrs 4.1 yrs
School Enrollment Rate Age 5-296 57.7% 55.2% 52.7% 55.2%
                                                                                                                                    
1 OECD, Education at a Glance, 1993, p. 117.
2 OECD, 1993, p. 176 & NCES, 1992, p. 107. The US data does not include GED certificates. The labor
market does not view the GED as equivalent to a high school diploma. GED certified high school
equivalents are paid 6 percent more than high school dropouts but 8 to 11 percent less than high
school graduates.
3 OECD 1993, pp. 129 & 131.
4 OECD 1993, p. 179.
5 Calculated by summing the ratios of FTE enrollment to population for one year age groups from age 16
to 29. (DECD, 1993, pp. 117, 129 & 131).
6 OECD 1993, p. 108.
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American youth no longer spend considerably more time in school than French and
Dutch youth (see Table 3). Not only are graduation standards higher, graduation rates are
higher as well. In 1991 graduation rates were 82.2 percent in the Netherlands, 75.8 percent in
France and 75.5 percent in the United States. The large proportions of 18 and 19 year olds
attending secondary school in France and the Netherlands indicate how high graduation
standards are made compatible with high graduation rates. Students having difficulty with the
fast paced curriculum do not drop out; rather, they repeat grades and thus gain extra time to
prepare for the demanding external exams. Many participate in vocational programs and
apprenticeships that currently account for 54 percent of French and 70 percent of Dutch upper
secondary students (DECD 1993, p. 119).
The benefit of the early completion of secondary school in the U.S. is that large numbers
of students enter tertiary education at a young age. However, some of the material covered
during the first two years of college in the United States is covered in upper secondary school in
France and the Netherlands. Despite lower college attendance rates in France and the
Netherlands, larger shares of 18-21 year olds in France (52.2 percent on a FTE basis) and the
Netherlands (56.4 percent) are enrolled in school (either secondary or tertiary) than in the
United States (40.4 percent). Between age 16 and 29, the average American spends 4.1
FTE years in school, British youth spend 2.3 years, French youth spend 4.6 years and
Dutch youth spend 4.9 years (OECD 1993, pp. 117, 129 & 131). These statistics contradict
the widely held belief that the American education system, despite all its faults, at least achieves
higher levels of participation than continental systems. Yes, more bachelor degrees are
awarded in the U.S., but there is doubt that the BAs awarded by America's second rank
universities represent the same standard of achievement as comparable European degrees?
Hard evidence on this issue is not available.
2.3 Teacher Quality and Compensation
The quality of the people recruited into teaching is very important. The teacher's general
academic ability and subject knowledge are the characteristics that most consistently predict
student learning (Hanushek 1971, Strauss and Sawyer 1986, Ferguson 1990, Ehrenberg and
Brewer 1993, Monk 1992).
Secondary school teaching is not a prestige occupation in the United States and it
apparently does not attract the kind of talent that is attracted into the profession in France and
the Netherlands. Since university admission standards are higher in Europe, the university
graduate pool from which European secondary school teachers are recruited is better educated
on average than the college graduate pool out of which American teachers are recruited.
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Furthermore, American teachers are generally not the most talented members of the pool of
college graduates. In 1977- 8 the Math Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score of intended
education majors was .38 standard deviations (SDs) below the overall average, one SD below
engineering majors and 1.2 SDs below majors in the physical sciences. The Verbal SAT of
intended education majors was .30 SDs below the overall average (NCES 1992, Table 124). In
this respect, Britain is similar; entrants into programs preparing primary school teachers have
significantly lower A level grades than average for university entrants (O'Leary 1993).
In France, by contrast, almost all secondary school teachers have passed rigorous
subject matter examination. In 1991 only 31.3 percent of those who took the written exam for
the Certificat d'Aptitude au Professorat de l'Enseignement du Secondaire (the most common of
these examinations) passed it. The best teaching jobs go to those who pass an even more
rigorous examination, the Agregation Externe, which had a pass rate of 17.7 percent in 1991
(Ministere de 1'Education Nationale et de la Culture, 1992 p. 205 & 206). French and Dutch
secondary school teachers tend to be recruited from the middle (not the bottom half) of a pool of
graduates of tertiary education which is in turn a highly selected sample of the nation's
population.
Furthermore, American teachers are often not very expert in the fields they teach.
Recent college graduates recruited into math or science teaching jobs spent only 30 percent of
their college career taking science and mathematics courses. Since 46 percent had not taken a
single calculus course, the prerequisite for most advanced mathematics courses, it appears that
most of the math taken in college was reviewing high school mathematics (LACES 1993b, p.
428429). The graduates of the best American universities typically do not enter secondary
school teaching because the pay and conditions of work are relatively poor.
Compensation: The high academic standards for entry into upper secondary teaching
in France and the Netherlands are sustainable only if wages and conditions of work are
attractive. Data on the relative compensation of secondary school teachers is presented in
Table 4.  American upper secondary teachers start at a wage that is 14 percent below that of
the average worker and after 15 years of experience they earn only 33 percent more.1  Starting
salaries are equally low in England. However, in France starting salaries are 6 percent above
the all worker average and in the Netherlands they are 39 percent higher. In France, England
and Scotland upper secondary school teachers with 15 years of experience are paid 61 to 63
percent more than the average worker and in the Netherlands they are paid 132 percent more.
By contrast, American primary school teachers are paid almost as much as their Dutch and
French counterparts.
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Table 4
Teacher Compensation and Conditions of Work
Nether- Eng- Scot-   United
France lands land land States
Compensation- -Teacher/All Employees1
Upper Sec. Teacher--Start. 1.06 1.39 .87 .91  .86
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.61 2.32 1.63 1.61  1.33
Lower Sec. Teacher--Start. .95 1.12  .87 .91  .86
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.44 1.58 1.63 1.61  1.33
Primary Sch. Teacher-Start. .93 .97 .87 .91  .84
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.34 1.39 1.57 1.61  1.30
Teacher Class Contact Hrs/Yr2
Upper Secondary School 532 943 776 887 825
Lower Secondary School 706 943 776 887 748
Primary School 875 1014 1013 950 1098
Class Size3
Upper Secondary 29 24 16 15 25.6
Lower Secondary 24 28 16 20 26.8
Primary 23 25 25 20 24.0
Sec. School Students/Teachers4 14.0 15.9 14.7 14.7 15.5
Sec. School Expenditure/student 28.% 24.7% 28.0% 28.0% 29.4%
Relative to GDP per capita5
Share of Staff not Classroom 36 % 20 % --- --- 47%
Teachers6
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of compensation to
wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher compensation was then divided by average
compensation of all workers. The figure for French upper secondary teachers is a weighted average of salaries
for Agrege (20%)
and others (80%). (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 90 & 91).
2 Mean number of students in each class. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, Table IL2.)
3 Mean number hours teaching a class per week times the mean number of weeks in the school year. (Nelson and
O'Brien, 1993, Table 11.3. & IL4.) Time devoted to preparation, in service training and to non teaching activities
are not included in this total.
4 The ratio of the number of full-time-equivalent pupils enrolled in public and private secondary schools to the number
of full-time-equivalent secondary school teachers (OECD 1993, p. 104).
5 Data on expenditure relative to GDP per capita is from DECD, Education at a Glance, 1993, p. 95.
6 Share of all staff employed in publicly funded elementary and secondary schools and ministries of education that are
not classroom teachers. The non-teaching staff includes administrators at all levels, teachers aides, guidance
counselors, librarians, nurses, custodial staff, food service workers, bus drivers, and clerical workers. The Dutch
figure is for all three levels of schooling (DECD 1993 p. 100). The French figure is for secondary education only
(Ministere de l'Education Nationale et de la Culture 1992, p. 184). The U.S. figure is for public elementary and
secondary schools and does not include people working for State Departments of Education (LACES 1992, p.
88). In the U.S. teachers aides account for 8.8 percent of school staff.
Signaling, Incentives, and School Organization                                                                                                        WP 94-25
Page 11
The lower pay in the United States is not compensation for more attractive conditions of
work (see Table 4). French secondary school teachers are in front of a classroom only 532
hours per year. Their American counterparts teach 825 hours per year. Teaching hours are
similar to U.S. levels in England and Scotland (776 and 886 respectively), but class sizes are
substantially smaller. Dutch upper secondary teachers are the only group that clearly have
heavier teaching loads than American teachers (Nelson and O'Brien 1993). (see Table 4).
When the salaries of college graduates are compared, education majors in the U.S.
come out at the very bottom. Starting salaries of U.S. mathematics and physical science majors
who entered teaching were 42 percent below the salaries of those who obtained computer
programming and system analyst jobs and 35 percent below the starting salaries of those
obtaining jobs in mathematics or physical science (LACES 1993b, p. 26). University graduates
who majored in physical science earned 78 percent more and economics majors earned 92
percent more than education majors over the course of their working lifetime (Kominski and
Sutterlin 1992). Since Americans with university training in mathematics and science can earn
much more outside of teaching, those with talent in these areas are difficult to recruit into high
school teaching. This results in most teachers being poorly prepared in science and
mathematics. This may help explain why American students lag behind French and Dutch
students in mathematics and science, but not in reading. The fact that American primary school
teachers are almost paid as much as French and Dutch teachers may also help explain why
American 9-10 year olds compare favorably to their counterparts abroad.
There is a deeper question, however. Why are the academic standards for entry into
secondary school teaching in the U.S. set so low? Why are salaries so low?
2.4 Priority Given to Academics
The four countries have similar student/teacher ratios and similar ratios of expenditure
per student to per- capita GDP (see table 4). So, how are American school budgets allocated, if
not into high teacher salaries? The money freed up by paying low salaries is used to hire
additional non-teaching staff. Non teachers account for nearly one-half of the employees in
public education in the U.S, but only one-fifth of employees in the Netherlands and only 36
percent of secondary education employees in France (see the bottom row of Table 4). These
staff perform services (such as bus transportation, sports activities, before and after school day
care, counseling and occupational training) which are provided by other governmental
organizations or the private sector in some other nations. The money also pays for the more
attractive buildings, sports facilities, large school libraries, the numerous computers and colorful
texts that are typical of American secondary schools. In part, this reflects the fact that books,
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computers and buildings are cheaper (relative to teachers of constant quality) in the United
States. American spending patterns also reflect different goals. Academic achievement is the
over arching goal (some would say the only goal) of French and Dutch secondary schools. In
the U.S., academic achievement must compete with other goals. American schools are also
expected to foster selfesteem, to provide counseling, supervised extra-cur icular activities,
musical training, health services, community entertainment (eg. interscholastic sports), drivers
education and to do all this in a racially integrated setting. These other goals require additional
staff and different kinds of staff. They may not be served by hiring teachers with a strong
background in calculus or chemistry, so resources get diverted from paying the high salaries
necessary to recruit teachers thoroughly educated in chemistry. Unlike France, selection into
teaching is not based almost solely on competence in the subject matter.
The question remains, however, Why do American school administrators give
academic achievement lower priority than French and Dutch administrators? This
question will be taken up later in the paper.
2.4 Time Devoted to Instruction
Many studies have found learning to be strongly related to time on task (Whey 1986,
Walberg 1992). How do the five countries differ in the time that students spend in classrooms
and doing homework? Table 5 reports the results of a variety of studies that compare time
devoted to instruction. While estimates vary across studies, the pattern for secondary school
students in the 1980s and 90s is that French, Dutch and Scottish students spent 5 to I S percent
more time in school than U.S. students. English students, by contrast, spent 6 to 9 percent less
time in school than U.S. secondary school students.2
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Table 5
Student Time--Instruction and Homework
Nether- Eng- Scot- United
France lands land land States
Total Hours of Instruction/Year
Primary Sch.-19711 918 1040 900 1040 900
5th Grade in 19822 --- --- 984 --- 1070
4th Grade in 19915 840 975 --- --- 954
Secondary Sch-19711 775 1120 900 1080 900
9th Grade in 19822 --- 1007 1025 --- 1141
8th Grade in 19823 1187 1000 896 1067 1008
9th Grade in 19915 1030 1092 --- --- 792
Age 13 in 19914 1073  --- 960 1031 1003
Hours of Homework in All Subjects
Hrs/wk--9th Grade in 19822 --- 8.4 6.0 --- 9.6
Hrs/wk--8th Grade in 19823 8 5 5 3 5
Hrs/wk-12th Grd Math Stud (1982)3 --- --- --- --- 9
Hrs/wk-12th Grd Sci Stud (1982)2 --- --- 11.5 --- 9.8
Hrs/wk in 4th Grade (1991)5 .53 hrs .13 hrs --- ---     1.89 hrs
Hmwk GT 2 hrs/day-Age 13 (1991)4 55% --- 30% 15% 30%
Hrs/Wk on Language Arts-4th Grade5 9 hrs 7 hrs --- --- 11 hrs
# LangA Hmwk Assign/wk Grd 9-1 915 1.6 .4 --- --- 2.3
Time Devoted to Mathematics
Math Share--8th Grade (1982)3 12% 10% 13% 14% 14%
Hrs/wk Math Instr-Age 13 (1991)4 3.83 -- 3.17 3.50 3.80
Hrs/wk Math Hmwk--Age 13 (1991)4 1.93 -- 1.27 1.00 1.52
Hrs/wk Math Hmwk--8th Gr (1982)3 4.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Time Devoted to Science
Science Share--5th Grade (1971)1 8% 2% 3% 3% 7%
Science Share--5th Grade (1982)2 --- --- 4% --- 10%
Science Share--9th Grade (1971)1 8% 7% 8% 5% 10%
Science Share--9th Grade (1982)2 --- 25% 10% --- 20%
Hrs/wk Science Instr-Age 13-19914 2.90 --- 3.23 3.00 3.88
Hrs/wk Science Hmwk-Age 13-19914 .68 --- .97 .65 1.06
                                                                                                                                    
1 First International Science Study, Passow, Noah, Eckstein and Mallea, 1976. 262,268.
2 Second International Science Study, Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, 14-33.
3 Second International Mathematics Study, Robitaille and Garden, 1989, pp. 36 & 79.
4 International Assessment of Educational Progress, 1992a & 1992b.
5 Lundberg and Linnakyla (1992, pp. 20-25. 57-59) analysis of the 1991 International Association for the
Evaluation of Educational Achievement study of Reading.
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Differences in instruction time may explain some achievement differentials between
countries. But they do not explain the generally poor showing of U.S. secondary school students
in mathematics and science. While American students spend less total time in school, they get
more mathematics and science instruction time than French, Dutch and Scottish students.
Heavy European time commitments to foreign language study tend to crowd out mathematics
and science instruction. In lower secondary school, British students study one foreign language
and French and Dutch students generally study two. In America, by contrast, few lower
secondary school students study a foreign language and, by the end of high school, graduates
have taken an average of only 1.46 years of foreign language (NCES 1992, p. 131).
European students learn mathematics and science more thoroughly than American
students even when they spend less time on it. For example, in the IAEP study, mathematics
instruction time was the same in France and the U.S., yet French students knew about 1.47
U.S. grade level equivalents more mathematics than American students. In science, by contrast,
instruction time was one hour per week less in France, yet Americans still lagged about
one-third of a U.S. grade level equivalent behind French students. Why does an hour of
instruction in French and Dutch classrooms produce more learning than in American
classrooms? Could heavier homework assignments be the explanation?
Homework: Harris Cooper's (1989) meta-analysis of randomized experimental studies
found that students assigned homework scored about one-half of a standard deviation higher on
post tests than students not receiving homework assignments. The impact of homework on the
rate at which middle school students learn was also significant, though somewhat smaller.
Non-experimental studies employing IEA and IAEP data come to similar conclusions.
French lower secondary school students spent more time doing mathematics homework
and homework of all types.  For example, 55 percent of their 13 year olds reported doing over
two hours of homework a night, compared to 30 percent in the United States and England and
only 15 percent in Scotland.3  This is consistent with their lead in mathematics achievement. In
science, however, there is no evidence that Dutch and French students got more homework
than American students. Furthermore, English and Scottish lower secondary school students do
less homework (and have less instruction time) in mathematics and science than American
students and yet outperform them. Why does an hour of instruction and homework time
have larger learning effects in England, France and the Netherlands than in America?
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2.5 Engagement--Effort per Unit of Scheduled Time
Classroom observation studies reveal that American students actively engage in
learning activities for only about half the time they are scheduled to be in a classroom. A study
of schools in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged about 75
percent of class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students, the average
was 51 percent of class time (Frederick, 1977). Overall, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher (1979)
estimated 46.5 percent of the potential learning time is lost due to absence, lateness, and
inattention.
Just as important as the amount of time participating in a learning activity is the intensity
of the student's involvement in the process. At the completion of his study of American high
schools, Theodore Sizer (1984) characterized students as, "All too often docile, compliant, and
without initiative (p. 54)." John Goodlad (1983) described: "...a general picture of considerable
passivity among students... (p. 113)." The high school teachers surveyed by Goodlad ranked
"lack of student interest" as the most important problem in education. Sixty-two percent of 10th
graders agree with the statement, "I don't like to do any more school work than I have to"
(Longitudinal Survey of American Youth or LSAY, Q. AA37N).
Formal studies comparing ratios of on-task time to scheduled time are not available.
Nevertheless, people who have visited classrooms in France or the Netherlands and the U.S.
report that European teachers are less likely to be talking about extraneous matters and
European students are more likely to be paying attention and doing what they have been
assigned. My school visits in France and the Netherlands generated similar impressions.
Assuming these impressions are correct, Why is time on task higher in France and
the Netherlands? Why do French and Dutch secondary school mathematics and science
teachers apparently expect more of their students than American teachers?
III. SIGNALLING AS ULTIMATE CAUSE
External Examinations as Standard Setters
When questions such as those placed in bold type above are put to French citizens and
educators, they point to the high standards and pervasive influence of the Baccalaureat? In
1992, 71 percent of the age group took a Bac exam and 51 percent passed. Thirty- ight percent
of the Baccalaureate awarded were Bac Technologigue or Bac Professionel (i . in vocational
lines) (Ministere de L'Education Nationale 1993). This was a major accomplishment, for Bac
exams are set to a very high standard. The three-year lycee programs that prepare 43 percent
of the age cohort for the exam for the Bac General are quite rigorous. Bac Exams in
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mathematics, history/geography and French are set and marked by 23 regional academies.
School based assessments are used for other subjects (Madeus and Kellaghan 1991, p. 17).
The Bac exams taken in one's area of concentration are roughly comparable to the AP exams
taken by American students seeking college credit for high school work. Cornell University, for
example, generally awards advanced placement credit to recipients of the Baccalaureat
General.
The payoff to higher education is high, so access to university is highly prized. A Bac is
necessary for university admission and the line pursued and the mentions obtained on the exam
influence which university program one can enter.4  About 10 percent of those obtaining a Bac
General enter special programs which prepare them for the exam that regulates admission to
the elite Grandee Ecoles. The job market also rewards young people who have passed the Bac.
There are alternative lower level examined qualifications for employment such as the Brevet
d'Enseignment Professionnel (BEP) and the Certificat d Aptitude Professionelle (CAP), but the
Baccalaureat confers greater access to preferred jobs. In 1987, unemployment rates for 15 to
24 year olds were 37 percent for those without a diploma, 22 percent for those with CAPS or
BEPs, 18 percent for those with a Bac and 10 percent for university graduates (Ministere de
l’Education 1992b, p. 25).
Dutch university graduates earn 65 percent more than secondary school graduates at
age 45 to 64 (DECD 1992, 1993), so access to higher education is highly prized in the
Netherlands as well. Examinations set by the Ministry of Education influence access to
postsecondary education, so the high achievement of Dutch students in mathematics and
science can be explained in the same way.5  In both France and the Netherlands questions and
answers are published in newspapers and available on video text. The published exams signal
the standards that students and teachers must aim for.
Nine-tenths of English youth now take th  General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE) exam at the end of 11th grade and an increasing number take A levels two years later.
Scotland also has a system of external examinations. For the United Kingdom as a whole, the
ratio of the number of school leavers passing at least one A level (or the Scottish equivalent) to
the number of 19 year olds was 23 percent in 1991 (Government Statistical Service 1993, p. 8).
Completing an A level qualification lowers unemployment rates for 25-34 year olds from 16.9 to
6.9 percent and graduating from university lowers it further to 4.3 percent. University graduates
earn 66 percent more than secondary school graduates at age 45 to 64 (DECD 1992, p. 111).
Performance on GCSE and A level examinations and the equivalent Scottish exams determine
whether one can continue one's schooling and which university and program one can enter.
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Grades on the GCSE and A level exams are included on resumes and requested on job
applications, so employment opportunities depend on school results as well (Raffe 1984). These
examples suggest that external examinations in secondary school subjects which serve
important gate keeping functions contribute to higher levels of academic achievement. In the
United States, by contrast, admission to the best colleges depends on teacher assessments of
relative performance--rank in class and grades--and multiple choice format aptitude tests
that are not keyed to the courses taken in secondary school.
Of the 50 states, only New York has a system of achievement exams where students
are required to write essays and solve long mathematics problems. This appears to have raised
achievement levels in New York State. When the family income, parental education, race and
gender of SAT test takers are controlled, New York State has the highest adjusted mean
Scholastic Aptitude Test score of the sample of 38 states with an adequate numbers of test
takers to be included in the study (Graham and Husted, 1993). This benefit occurs despite that
fact that Regents exam grades account for less than half of the course grade and influence only
the type of diploma received. A passing score on Regents exams is not necessary for admission
to non-university higher education and employers ignore exams results when they make hiring
decisions.
External assessments of achievement that directly affect access to preferred educational
and job outcomes clearly increase student rewards for studying. They also change the
structure of rewards for learning and, therefore, the incentive environment of students,
teachers and administrators. I will argue that the structure of rewards for study is at least as
important as their size. These issues will be discussed under seven headings:
3.1   Peer group norms
3.2   Teacher incentives
3.3   Administrator incentives
3.4   Competition among upper secondary schools
3.5   High standards in the external exams
3.6   Redoublement, grade repeating, as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
3.7   Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
3.1 Peer Group Norms
In the United States, the peer group generally tries to discourage academic effort. No
adolescent wants to be considered a "nerd, brain geek, or grade grubber" or to be "acting
White," yet that is what happens in most classrooms to students who study hard and are seen to
study hard. Because the school's signals of achievement assess performance relative to fellow
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students through grades and class rank, not relative to an external standard, peers have a
personal stake in persuading each other not to study.
An important reason for peer pressure against studying is that pursuing academic
success forces students into a zero-sum competition with their classmates. Their achievement
is not being measured against an absolute, external standard. In contrast to scout merit badges,
for example, where recognition is given for achieving a fixed standard of competence, the
school's measures of achievement assess performance relative to fellow students through
grades and class rank. Students who study hard for exams make it more difficult for close
friends (other members of the class) to get an A or be ranked at the top of the graduating class.
Since devoting time to studying for an exam is costly, the welfare of the entire class is
maximized if no one studies for exams which are graded on a curve. The cooperative solution is
"no one studies more than the minimum." Participants are generally able to tell who has broken
the "minimize studying" code and reward those who conform and punish those who do not. Side
payments and punishments are made in a currency of friendship, respect and ridicule that is not
limited in supply. For most students the benefits that might result from studying for the exam are
less important than the very certain costs of being considered a "brain geek" or "acting White,"
so most students abide by the "minimize studying" "don't raise your hand too much" norm.
The peer norms that result are: "It is OK to be smart. You cannot help that. But, it is
definitely not OK to study hard to get a good grade." This is illustrated by the following story
related by a Cornell undergraduate:
Erroneously I was lumped into the brains genus by others at [high] school just
because of the classes I was in. This really irked me; not only was I not an
athlete but I was also thought of as one of those "brain geeks."  Being a brain
really did have a stigma attached to it. Sometimes during a free period I would sit
and listen to all the brains talk about how much they hated school work and how
they never studied and I had to bite my lip to keep from laughing out loud. I knew
they were lying, and they knew they were lying too. I think that a lot of brains
hung around together only because their fear of social isolation was greater than
their petty rivalries. I think that my two friends who were brains liked me because
I was almost on their level but I was not competitive (Tim 1986).
Note how those who broke the 'minimize studying' norm tried to hide the fact from classmates.
They did not espouse an alternative "learning is fun and important" norm.
The costs and benefits of studying vary across students because interest in the subject
varies, ability varies and parental pressure and rewards vary. This heterogeneity means that
some students break the "minimize studying" norm. When they are a small minority, they cannot
avoid feeling denigrated by classmates. In the top track and at schools where many students
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aspire to attend competitive colleges, they are numerous enough to create a sub culture of their
own with its own norms denigrating those who do poorly on tests or who disrupt classroom
activities. This is the structural basis of the "brains" and "preppie" cliques found in most
American high schools. Most high school students, however, are in cliques that denigrate
studying. At some school awards ceremonies, "some in the crowd jeer 'Nerd! "' as students are
called to come up to receive an award (Suskind, 5/26/94, p. 1).
Peer pressure was discussed in my interviews of school staff and students in England,
the Netherlands and France. The French educators I interviewed reported that peer pressure
not to study occurred sometimes, but only in some lower secondary school classes, not at the
lycee serving upper-middle class students that I visited. It appeared mild by American
standards. In upper secondary schools particularly in the math-science line, the peer pressure
was to excel. Discussions with English and Dutch students and educators produced similar
observations.
3.2 Teacher Incentives
Most American secondary school teachers do not feel individually accountable for the
learning of their students. The lack of accountability for learning stems from: (1) the rarity of
examinations assessing student achievement in particular subjects relative to an external
standard, and (2) the fact that most secondary school students receive instruction in a given
subject from many teachers. Only coaches, band conductors and teachers of advanced
placement classes are exceptions to this norm. They teach in environments where student
achievement is visible to parents and colleagues and as a result feel accountable for outcomes.
In France and the Netherlands, by contrast, upper secondary students are in small classes that
take most subjects together and generally remain intact for two or more years. Fewer than three
teachers share responsibility for preparing each class for the external exams in the subject. In
the Netherlands where schools are small, many subjects are taught by only one teacher. Since
important rewards accrue to those who pass or do well on these exams, everyone takes them
very seriously. The number of students taking and passing each exam is public knowledge
within the school and among parents. Exam results influence teachers' reputations. Responding
to such informal pressures, upper secondary school teachers strive to prepare their students for
the external exam.
American teachers are also expected to insure that most of their students pass,
but they are free to accomplish this goal by lowering the passing standard. Teachers who
set expectations too high get in trouble. For example, Adele Jones, an Algebra II teacher in
Georgetown Deleware, was fired because she failed too many of her students (42 percent one
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year and 27 percent the next). When students started picketing the school carrying "hastily
scrawled signs with such slogans as 'I Failed Ms. Jones' class and It Was My Fault' and 'Just
Because a Student is Failing Doesn't Mean the Teacher Is' (B adley 1993, p. 19)," the national
news media took notice. The principal of the school justified his decision with the following:
"I have made it very clear that one of my goals is to decrease the failure rate, to
make sure the kids feel good about learning, stay in class, stay in school and do
well .... Math is just a big body of knowledge; what is Algebra ll across the nation
anyway?" he asks. When he taught band, he adds, he certainly didn't expect kids
to finish the year as musicians--but he did want them to know more about music
than ...before....The talk about preparing students for college struck him as
"ludicrous. " Instead the goal should be to keep students studying math (Bradley,
Sept 19, 1993 p. 19, 20).
Senior Norman Kennedy said, however, the students who flunked Ms Jones class, "were
sleeping. They don't want to learn. They goof off, and they talk." At the hearing Walter Hall Jr., a
student who had flunked the course, testified:
"I guess some of it could be attributed to a lack of study, because I wasn't really
like into the books hour after hour, But in the rest of my classes, 1 was doing
fairly well, and it was only testing that gave me a problem. " He added that his
parents had wondered how he could be getting such good grades in most
classes without studying (p. 20).
Many teachers report being pressured to pass students. When asked "Is there pressure on your
teachers to pass students who don't earn a passing grade?", 58 percent of local teacher union
leaders in New York State responded YES.
Some school districts have a policy that each teacher's student grades are
printed out and distributed among the faculty. Those teachers with the lowest
student averages are singled out for "discussions" about why their students are
lower. (New York State United Teachers, March 3, 1994, p. 2).
Ms. Jones is unusual; most teachers realize that they must limit their failure rate. More
commonly, the struggle over expectations plays out in the privacy of the classroom. Theodore
Sizer's description of Ms. Shiffe's biology class, illustrates what sometimes happens:
She wanted the students to know these names. They did not want to know them
and were not going to learn them. Apparently no outside threat--flunking, for
example--affected the students. Shiffe did her thing, the students chattered on,
even in the presence of a visitor ....Their common front of uninterest probably
made examinations moot. Shiffe could not flunk them all, and, if their
performance was uniformly shoddy, she would have to pass them all. Her
desperation was as obvious as the students' cruelty toward her. (1984 p.
157-158)
Some exceptional teachers are able, through the force of their personalities, to induce
their students to undertake tough learning tasks. But for all too many, academic demands are
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compromised because the bulk of the class sees no need to accept them as reasonable and
legitimate.
3.3 Administrator Incentives
External assessment changes the incentives facing school administrators. In the U.S.
locally elected school boards and the administrators they hire make the thousands of decisions
that determine academic expectations and program quality. When there is no external
assessment of academic achievement, students at a school and their parents benefit little from
administrative decisions that opt for higher standards, more qualified teachers or a heavier
student work load. The immediate consequences of such decisions--higher taxes, more
homework, having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, less time for fun courses, a greater risk of
being denied a diploma-- re all negative. When student learning is not assessed externally, the
positive effects of choosing academic rigor are negligible and postponed. Since college
admission decisions are based on rank in class, GPA and aptitude tests, not externally
assessed achievement in high school courses, upgraded standards will not improve the college
admission prospects of the school's graduates. Graduates will do better in difficult college
courses and will be more likely to get a degree, but that benefit is uncertain and far in the future.
Maybe over time the school's reputation and, with it, the admission prospects of graduates will
improve because the current graduates are more successful in local colleges. That, however, is
even more uncertain and postponed.
Few American employers pay attention to a student's achievement in high school or the
school's reputation when they make hiring selections (Bishop 1993, Hollenbeck and Smith
1984). Those that do pay attention to achievement use indicators of relative performance such
as GPA and rank in class rather than results on an external exam as a hiring criterion.
Consequently, higher standards do not benefit students as a group, so parents as a group have
little incentive to lobby strongly for higher teacher salaries, higher standards and higher school
taxes. Employers who recruit from a local high school are often the only group with a real
interest in general increases in achievement. Since, however, they pay a disproportionate share
of school taxes, they tend to support only the policy options that do not cost additional money.
In many European countries, by contrast, the record of each school in the external
examinations (the numbers passing or getting high grades) is published in local and national
newspapers. Recent reforms in England and Scotland, for example, have resulted in schools
publishing annual reports that contain the grades received by last year's students in each
examined subject. These reports are now sent to parents of current and prospective students.
The school league tables have important effects on school reputations. Administrators seeking
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to strengthen their school's reputation are thus induced to give teaching effectiveness (as
assessed by the external exam) first priority.
3.4 Competition among Upper Secondary Schools
For generations French and Dutch upper secondary schools have faced a competitive
environment that is similar in many ways to the one faced by American colleges and
universities. Funding has been on a per student basis, so schools experiencing an increase in
applications have had an incentive to expand up to the capacity of their physical plant. Schools
with strong reputations get more applications than they can accept and are, in effect, rewarded
by being allowed to admit the "best" from their pool of applicants.
In the U.S. access to quality teaching and supportive peers depends on the parent's
ability to buy or rent a home in a suburb with excellent schools. In France and the Netherlands
access to the top upper secondary schools depends primarily on achievement in lower
secondary school. This means that parents who want their child to attend the best upper
secondary schools must make sure their child studies hard in lower secondary school.
The Netherlands has three types of general secondary school--the VWO, the HAVO and
the MAVO--and a system of lower vocational schools, LBO/LEAOs and KVBOs, which prepare
students for both occupation specific and general education exams. The first year curriculum is
supposed to be the same in all schools so that students can transfer between schools at its
conclusion. In succeeding years, however, curricula and rigor diverge. Rigor and work loads are
greatest at the six year VWOs, somewhat less demanding at the five year HAVOs and still less
demanding in the four year MAVOs. These schools also differ in the foreign languages offered
and the standard to which they are taught. The LBOs devote considerable time to
occupationally specific curricula, so less time is available for general studies.  Advise to parents
about which type of school is appropriate for their child is based on the pupil's record in primary
school. Parents have the right, however, to select the type of school and which school of that
type their child will enter. There are three parallel systems of education--a locally administered
public system, a Catholic system and a Protestant system--so parents have a great deal of
choice.
About a decade ago English and Scottish parents were given the right to send their
children to schools outside the normal attendance area. Two years after choice became
operational in Scotland, 9 percent of pupils entering secondary school nationally (11 to 14
percent in urban areas) attended a school outside their cachement area (Adler and Raab 1988).
Scottish parents who made this choice appeared to be behaving rationally for they tended to
choose schools that were more effective than the school in their own cachement area. An
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analysis of school choice in the Fife Education Authority found that the schools chosen by those
leaving their cachement area had better examination results than would have been predicted
given the pupil's primary school test scores and family background and the average SES of
pupils at the school.6  Consequently, the free choice of schools that prevails in our four
European nations generates a competitive pressure on schools to excel that doesn't have any
counterpart in the U.S. outside of cities with magnet schools.
3.5 Standards of the External Exam
External examinations at the end of secondary school are probably necessary if high
achievement levels are to be attained, but they are not sufficient. Effects will be small if the
exams are easy, are taken by only a small minority of students, or do not generate substantial
rewards for successful students. British youth have lower achievement levels than French and
Dutch youth. One possible explanation for this is that the passing standard of the GCSE is lower
than for the Bac and the Dutch exams, and the more difficult A levels are taken by only a small
minority.
High passing standards on external exams are clearly associated with high achievement
levels. Does this reflect a cause and effect relationship? Yes, but causation runs both ways.
High passing standards on medium and high stakes exams are politically sustainable only when
most students taking the exam are able to meet or surpass the standard. At present, the median
pupil in Britain is not expected to learn the entire times tables up to 10 X 10 until age 11. If the
GCSE mathematics exams were made more demanding without strengthening mathematics
teaching, failure rates might rise to politically unacceptable levels.
Does the passing standard also influence student effort? Yes it does. In High School and
Beyond data, those taking more rigorous courses learned a good deal more between
sophomore and senior year, even though their grade point average suffered as a result
(Gamoran and Barends 1987). Kulik and Kulik's meta analysis (1984) of the educational
literature found that students randomly assigned to skip a grade or to a compressed and
accelerated curriculum score 75 percent of a standard deviation higher on tests (a few years
later) than the matched non-accelerated students. Repeating a grade effectively lowers learning
goals and reduces the retained child's achievement a few years later by about 30 percent of a
standard deviation (Holmes 1989).
Over a hundred experimental studies have been conducted of the effect of goal difficulty
on various kinds of achievement. The effects are quite large: on highly complex tasks like
school and college course work, specific hard goals raised achievement by 47 percent of a
standard deviation (Wood, Mento and Locke 1987). In the laboratory and field settings used by
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psychologists conducting this research, the subjects have generally accepted the goal set for
them by the researcher. Achievement goes up, but the probability of failing to reach the goal
rises as well. In most studies more than two-thirds of those in the "hard goal" condition failed to
achieve their goal (Locke 1968 p. 163- 5). Most of the studies examine behavior over
relatively short periods of time. One would imagine, however, that if such experiments lasted a
couple of years, those who consistently failed to achieve their goal might lower their goals or
give up altogether.
Stedry (1960) found that when subjects who had already set their own goals were
assigned even higher goals by the study director, they rejected the assigned goal and
achievement did not rise. This appears to be what happens in American secondary schools.
Most students reject the goals teachers set because the rewards for success are small. Others
reject them because they appear unattainable.
How do European education systems induce students in upper secondary
schools to set difficult learning goals and work toward them? They do not, as some have
proposed for the U.S., set a single high yea-nay standard that everyone is expected to meet.
Young people are too different from each other for such a policy to work.7  When exams are
graded pass-fail and the same passing standard applies to all,many students are able to pass
the standard without exertion and will, therefore, not be stimulated to improve by the need to
pass the exam.8  Many other students will calculate that they are now so far behind and the
effort required to achieve the standard is so great, the costs of the effort are larger than the
possible reward. They will reject the goal of meeting the standard. When the variance of
performance is large, only a few students will find the reward attached to a single absolute
passing standard an incentive to study (Kang 1985). External exams need to signal the level of
a student's achievement, not just whether the exam was passed. Dutch external exams are
graded on a 1 to 10 scale. Excellence on the Baccalaureat exams results in the award of a
Mention Tres Bien, a Mention Bien or a Mention Assez Bien. Once information on performance
levels becomes available, employers and institutions of higher education will tend to base their
selection decisions on it. Graduates with the strongest exam results have options not available
to those with weak results, and the outcome is a system of graduated rewards. When the
variance of achievement is high, incentives for effort are stronger on average under a graduated
rewards system than under a single large reward attached to achieving a fixed standard (Kung
1985).
The English GCSE and Scottish "Lowers" Examinations are taken by 90 percent of 16
year olds. As recommended by Kang's model, they generate substantial and graduated rewards
Signaling, Incentives, and School Organization                                                                                                        WP 94-25
Page 25
for learning what appears on the exams. Indeed the rewards for doing particularly well on these
external exams, while smaller than those in France, appear larger than those in the
Netherlands.9  Why then are English and Scottish 13 year olds assigned less homework
than their American and Dutch counterparts? Why is their achievement in mathematics
and science at age 13 significantly lower than in the Netherlands? A  the time for the exam
approaches in Britain, teacher demands and student effort increase substantially. At age 13,
however, standards are low. Why do the backwash effects of the secondary school
graduation exams extend further back in the pupil's schooling in the Netherlands and
France than in Britain?
3.6 Redoublement as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
One explanation for low British standards for 10-13 year olds is the lack of immediate
rewards for doing well in classes. The external exams are three to six years away. Students are
promoted to the next grade no matter how well they do in the previous grade. Those who fall
behind inevitably slow the pace of the class in succeeding years. Primary school teachers do
not feel accountable for how well students do on exams taken after four years of attendance at
a secondary school. Secondary schools tend to be large and the teachers who handle the first
year students also lack a sense of accountability for performance on exams that are more than
three years in the future.
The situation is very different in France and the Netherlands. Pupils who fail more than
one of their courses are generally required to redoubler or "to repeat the grade." In 1990 Dutch
redoublement rates were 7.5 percent per year in academic lower secondary schools, 5.1
percent per year in LBOs, the vocational lower secondary schools, and 13.3 percent per year in
academic upper secondary schools (Central Bureau Voor De Statistiek, 1993 pp. 19, 20 & 29).
French rates of redoublement ranged from 6.8 and 11.0 percent per year during the four years
of general lower secondary education, ranged from 12.1 to 18.4 percent per year in the three
year academic upper secondary schools and averaged 8.4 percent per year in the first two
years of vocational upper secondary schools (Ministere de 1'Education Nationale et de la
Culture 1992, p. 77, 93 & 99. According to H. D. Lewis, the "basic motivation is to help the child
himself, to ensure that the pupil is sufficiently well prepared so that he may fully benefit from
work at a more demanding level (1985 p. 5)" For French teachers, redoublement is a form of
Mastery Learning, a way of allowing some students extra time to achieve very demanding
learning goals. Consequently, at age 19, 31.6 percent of French and 41.5 percent of Dutch
youth are still in secondary school compared to 3.4 percent in Britain and 5 percent in the
United States.
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Redoublement is not something that is inflicted only on children from lower class
backgrounds. Often high aspirations can be achieved only by redoublement. The two Dutch
professors with grown children with whom I have discussed this matter both had a child who
was required to redoubler. In France selective upper secondary schools serving upper middle
class communities have grade repeating rates that are nearly as high as schools serving lower
income communities. For example, Lycee Charlemagne, an upper secondary school serving
one of the richest neighborhoods in Paris, asked 14 percent of its entering class to repeat the
year in 1992.
For French and Dutch teenagers, the threat of having to redoubles is a strong incentive
to study. When I asked how the students who must redouble feel about it, I was told that they
feel "dishonored." Since redoublement is a public event, parents also feel stigmatized, so they
have an incentive to see that their child studies hard. In the Netherlands, students struggling
with the fast paced VWO or HAVO curricula are often given a choice: either repeat the year or
transfer to a less demanding school. At the VWO I visited in the Netherlands, one third of the
entering class transfers to a HAVO or a less demanding VWO before the beginning of the third
year. VWOs offer a fast paced six year university preparation program. Parents who want their
child to enter a VWO are generally accommodated even when primary school teachers advise
against it. The child's performance in school determines whether the parents' aspirations are
realized or whether a transfer to a less demanding type of school is necessary. Being forced to
transfer to a HAVO or a MAVO does not foreclose university attendance. With good grades at
the end of the five year HAVO program the student can transfer to a VWO, complete the final
two years and then enter a university. In addition, numerous vocationally oriented higher
education options are open to HAVO and MAYO graduates and transfers to university are
feasible with good grades.
While other routes to university are possible, pupils who choose the fast track in 7th
grade, a V WO, do not want to be forced "to get off the train." Students in the Netherlands and
France are formed into classes which take most subjects together and which remain intact for
two years and sometimes longer. Friendships tend to develop within this class. When I asked a
Dutch student who, despite long hours of study, had been required to repeat a grade, why she
had studied so hard, she responded "I wanted to stay with my class!" Students do not want
to have to repeat the grade because it threatens to sever the friendships they have made in the
class. Apparently, trying to keep up academically (i.e. accepting the academic goals of the
school) is viewed positively by peers because it is an expression of commitment to the group.
Those who refuse to study are apparently seen as rejecting the group. In these two countries
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peer pressure seems to encourage lagging students to study, not discourage them as in the
U.S.10
3.7 Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
All education systems give upper secondary students (and their parents) the right to
select a specialty and the right to choose the rigor and difficulty level of either the school, the
academic program or specific courses.
In France four academic lines--literature and languages (A), economics and social
science (B), mathematics and physical sciences (C), and biology (D)--have roughly equal
numbers of students and together account for most of the Baccalaureat Generales awarded.
The Mathematics-Physics-Chemistry line (C) is the most difficult, carries the greatest prestige
and gives one the best chance of being admitted to a preparatory school for one of the elite
Grandes Ecoles. Admission to the C line within a lycee is generally highly competitive. The
Netherlands has a similar though less elaborated system of specialization within general upper
secondary education. As in France the math-science line has the reputation of being the most
difficult.
In France and the Netherlands, picking one's school and specialization effectively sets a
specific learning goal. The prevalence of grade repeating and transfers to easier schools
suggests that most students and parents initially set very difficult goals. The goal setting
literature tells us that working toward a specific and difficult goal leads to greater effort and
performance than being told to "do your best" or setting easy goals. Thus the continental
European pattern of setting highly ambitious goals, maximizes average achievement levels
even while it increases the number of students who fail to achieve the goal they initially set.
Why do French and Dutch parents select secondary schools and programs that are so
challenging that many must repeat grades to keep up or transfer into easier programs
and schools? There are three reasons. First, the goal selected is visible to parents, relatives
and neighbors and going for difficult goals confers prestige. Second, achieving difficult learning
goals is rewarded by admission to preferred universities and fields of study and access to better
jobs. Finally, the choice is generally made by the parent, not the child. Parents are better
informed about the long term benefits of achieving difficult goals and their own prestige rises
when their child attends a selective school or pursues a difficult line of study. Parents may view
the extra studying necessary in a rigorous specialty as a plus not a minus.
In America, by contrast, selecting difficult goals generates much weaker rewards.
Everyone in the neighborhood attends the same school. Students select individual courses, not
programs or schools. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor of these courses
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is not well signaled to parents, relatives, neighbors, employers and colleges. Admissions staff at
selective colleges learn how to read the transcripts of high schools they recruit from and they
evaluate grades in that light. However, many colleges have, historically, not factored the rigor of
high school courses into their admissions decisions. Almost no employers do. Consequently,
most students not aspiring to attend a selective college avoid rigorous courses and demanding
teachers. As one student put it:
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while. But it was
pretty hard and the teacher moved fast. I switched to the other history and I'm
getting better grades. So my average will be better for college. Unless you are
going to a college in the state, it doesn't really matter whether you get a Regent's
diploma. (Ward, 1994)
Another student who had avoided the harder courses even though she was sure she could do
the work explained her decision with, "W y should I do it, [the extra work,] if I don't have to?"
(Ward 1994) Some students, the minority who want to attend selective colleges, sign up for
demanding courses. Most students choose courses that have the reputation of being fun and
not requiring much work to get a good grade. Teachers know this and adjust their style of
teaching, assignments and grading standards with an eye to maintaining enrollment levels.
IV. SUMMARY AND LESSONS
In the Netherlands and France, learning in secondary school is assessed by difficult
subject-specific external examinations and doing well on these exams generates very large
rewards for the student. The reputations of teachers and schools are also affected by student
achievement on these exams. Parents base their selection of the upper secondary school their
child will attend and which academic or vocational program he/she will pursue, in part, on these
reputations. Parents tend to set difficult goals for their children, so most students are placed in
programs of study that for them are very demanding. Students are formed into classes which
take all their subjects together, remain intact for two years or more and become the student's
circle of friends. Students who are not progressing at the rate necessary to succeed on the
external exam are asked either to switch to an easier curriculum or to repeat the year. Students
do not want to be forced to sever the friendships they have developed in the class, so they are
strongly motivated to keep up with their studies.
In the United States, students are ranked relative to their classmates, not assessed
against an external criterion, so they pressure each other not to study. Teachers are expected
to pass almost all students, and if the class fails to study hard, the teacher is forced to lower the
passing standard of the course. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor of the
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courses and the learning achievements that result are not well signaled to parents, neighbors,
colleges and employers, so rewards for setting difficult goals are small.
The French and Dutch models of secondary education combine in one system
many of the most drastic reforms that have been proposed for the United States:
1. Externally set subject-specific achievement exams taken by almost all
secondary school graduates which supplement not displace teacher
assessment of students. Grades on the external exams need to matter to the
student, but they need not be the sole or primary determinant of desired
outcomes such as college admissions and access to the best jobs.
2. Parental choice of upper secondary school and special field of study with
money following students.
3. Mastery learning with teeth (those who fail two subjects in secondary school
are required to either repeat the grade or transfer to a less demanding school
or program).
4. Secondary teaching is available only to those who demonstrate very high levels
of competence in their subject. High entry standards are sustained by offering
high wages and good working conditions.
5. High standards for admission to the next stage of education.
This system of incentives and school organization appears to work for France and the
Netherlands. A similar system, lacking only the externally set exit exams, also works well in
undergraduate education in the United States. At the secondary level, however, such reforms
are controversial. Successful implementation of any one of these reforms would be a major
political undertaking? Implementation of the whole package of reforms is politically infeasible at
present. Yet the analysis suggested that when, in Britain, just two elements of the
package--mastery learning with teeth and attractive teacher salaries-- re missing and a third
element, school choice, is only recently introduced, achievement levels were substantially lower
than in the Netherlands and France. Consequently, from a practical policy point of view the
message is not very positive. School climates and educational standards do not change rapidly
and easily. France and the Netherlands have not discovered a cheap and painless route to
higher achievement.
The important lesson is that incentives--both their strength and structure--matter. There
are less controversial ways of increasing the rewards for academic achievement, so the
analysis should not cause American reformers to despair. Reforms tailored to the American
context have a greater chance of successful implementation than an effort to replicate the
French or Dutch systems of secondary education.
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President Clinton, former President Bush and most of the nation's governors support the
development of a system of v luntary European style achievement examinations for upper
secondary students. Everyone recognizes, however, that the decentralized character of
American education and the controversial nature of specifying and assessing what young
people should know and be able to do requires a slow consensus building approach.
Consequently, it will probably be decades before external examinations in specific subjects are
widespread in the United States. School cultures are resistant to change, so significant
improvements in achievement will take even longer.
Lessons for Economic Analysis of Education Issues
Much of the economic research on elementary and secondary education has employed
a production function paradigm. Conventionally, test scores measuring academic achievement
are the outputs, teachers are the labor input and students are goods in process. Even though I
have written papers in this tradition myself, I am concerned that many of the inputs that
conventionally appear on the right in these models are really endogenous and that severely
biased findings may result.
This paper points in different directions. Schools are viewed as worker managed
organizations producing multiple products. In the classroom/school team production unit,
students are as much workers as the teachers. Students are also consumers who choose which
goals (outputs) to focus on and how much effort to put into each goal. The behavior of each of
the system's actors (teachers, administrators, school board, students and parents) depends on
the incentives facing them. The incentives, in turn, depend upon the cost and reliability of the
information (signals) that are generated about the various outputs of the system. I think the
discussion above demonstrate the relevance of agency theory, game theory, signaling theory
and other elements of economic theory to the understanding of how schools and students
operate. I am sure I have only scratched the surface. Deeper plowing of these furrows will, I
predict, yield a large crop of new insights into education and education policy.
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ENDNOTES
1 . Since many countries fund pensions and medical insurance through mandated social
security taxes, it is essential to include both voluntary and compulsory contributions for
these purposes in the measurement of teacher compensation. Compensation of
secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of
compensation to wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher
compensation was then divided by average compensation of all workers. (Nelson and
O'Brien, 1993, pp. 37, 74 & 93).
2 . Estimates of total amount of time students in a country spend in school seems to depend
on whom you ask and how the question is worded. The data quality problem was dealt
with by calculating an average across studies. The total instruction per year for each
country was first expressed as a ratio to the U.S. level. Then a mean ratio was
calculated by averaging the ratios from the studies that provided a comparison with the
U.S. Sources are given in Table 5's footnotes.
3 . The educational excellence movement in the U.S. caused a substantial increase in
homework assignments and the time spent on homework between 1980 and 1990. In
1982 27 percent of 13 year olds and 30 percent of 17 years olds reported not being
assigned any homework. Another 11.5 (6.0) percent of 17 (13) year olds reported not
doing it. By 1990 only 5-6 percent of 13 and 17 year olds reported getting no homework
and only 4 to 8 percent reported not doing what was assigned (National Center for
Education Statistics 1993 p. 351-2).
4 . While the Bac is a necessary first step to getting a university education, it is not sufficient
because failure rates in university are quite high.
5 . The Ministry of Education sets an exam which has both essay and multiple choice
components. The multiple choice component which represents half the written paper is
graded centrally. The essay component is marked by the student's own teacher and by a
teacher from another school with the aid of a marking scheme supplied by the Ministry.
Oral components are administered by the student's teacher.
6 . Analysis of data on out of cachement school selections for the Fife LEA found that the
Type B school effect estimates (measures of how well each school does compared to
others serving pupils of similar ability and social background) are significantly and
substantially higher at the schools selected by parents choosing to leave their
cachement area. My summary sentence sounds different from Willms and Echols (1993)
summary of their own results because they unaccountably base their conclusions on
estimates of school effects from models which did not control for the pupil's ability when
entering secondary school and which they acknowledge are biased. Luckily they also
present results based on correctly specified models with controls for initial ability in Table
3 of the paper.
7 . On the criterion referenced IAEP mathematics scale, 15-17 percent of American 13 year
olds have better mathematics skills than the average 17 year old student, and 7-9
percent of 13 year olds score below the average nine year old (LACES 1992). The
variance of achievement is roughly comparable in Europe and East Asia (IAEP 1992a
1992b).
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8 . In the U.S. minimum competency tests are taken in ninth or tenth grade and most
students pass them on the first sitting. Thus for the great majority of students, such
exams have no further effect on incentives to study. Incentives effects are focused on
the small minority who fail them on the first round.
9 . In the U.K., access to 6th form programs preparing for university, vocational technical
programs of various kinds and employment depend on the student's performance on the
GCSE and Scottish lowers. Since A level results are not available at the time initial
university admission decisions are made, GCSE results influence which university and
which field of study a student is admitted to. In the Netherlands the passing standard is
high, but exceeding it by a large margin generates few rewards because the external
exam results are only part of the student's overall grade and access to the most popular
university fields of study is on a first-come first-serve basis. In addition, there is much
less variation in the quality and reputation of Dutch universities than of British
universities.
10 . One would not expect the study effort of primary school pupils to be influenc d by the
prospect of being retained. The hypothesis of significant threat induced incentive effects
applies to students in small secondary schools or large schools organized into small
classes which take most subjects together and remain intact from year to year. Since
most American students are in large high schools where peer relationships are not tied
to taking particular courses, failing two courses does not sever peer relationships the
way it does in Europe. Consequently, one would not expect the threat of failing courses
to be the powerful motivator that it appears to be in France and the Netherlands. The
argument against retention is that it effectively lowers the learning goals being set for the
student in subsequent years. Within-school cross-section studies have established that
subsequent learning is reduced by retention (Holmes 1989). It also, apparently,
increases the risk of dropping out before graduation (Grissom and Shepard 1989).
Consequently, it is doubtful that higher retention rates would increase achievement
levels at a given age in the U.S.
